"Karzai Hails New Afghan Hyatt," Seattle Post-Intelligencer (April 17, 2004). Photo by Emilio Morenatti.Via Human Security Review, a perceptive article lamenting the "militarization" of humanitarian aid. It is a legitimate complaint, given that the tying of humanitarian relief to broader counterinsurgency/stabilization missions has put into doubt the neutrality of aid organizations and made them accessories, in some cases, to missions they do not support. However, it's also unavoidable.
Conflict is one of the major causes of human misery. Whether it is economic desperation from wartime scarcity, the devastation inflicted by attacks on cities, the ravages of a brutal counterinsurgency, the generalized loss of safety of living in a collapsing state, or targeted political or ethnic purges, it is well-established that civilians suffer most from war. This is especially true today, when actors in interstate conflicts frequently target civilians as part of their war strategy. This does not solely include roving gangs like Ugandan Lords' Resistance Army and the Somalian "technicals." States regularly use political violence on their own people. Right now, Ethiopia is employing the oldest counterinsurgency tactic in the book against its Ogaden province: starve 'em all till they give up.
NGOs have traditionally relied on their neutrality and explicitly humanitarian mission for safety. Although many sides in civil wars frequently attacked NGOs, it is safe to say that in the broad picture their neutrality and reputation as peacemakers provided a more efficient form of protection from violence than guns and tanks.
However, this is not the case anymore. As Ralph Peters perceptively notes, the typical interstate foot soldier, government paramilitary or non-state fighter, is erratic, "habituated to violence, [and has] no stake in civil order. Unlike [conventional] soldiers, warriors do not play by our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like."
Rendering humanitarian aid becomes nearly impossible without dispersing these forces. A deal made with one commander will not be respected by the other. Food supplies will be diverted for war. And in many cases, the "warrior" is the cause of the humanitarian problem, targeting civilians for slave labor, torture, rape, and death. These fighters have little qualms about targeting humanitarian relief workers for either political or purely atavistic reasons. In a conflict where one side sees an entire ethnic group as the enemy, humanitarian aid to that group can make relief workers out to be "enemies" too.
Additionally, the identification of aid groups with the West and the United Nations can also endanger them in regions where anti-American or purely anti-Western feelings are strong. But many fighters need no kind of elaborate political justification to point their gun at a NGO. Any middle-class foreigner who operates in a conflict zone is a status target.
So, relief workers have a number of security options. However, who you choose to be protected by can immensely complicate humanitarian relief operations.
They can choose to be protected by host country forces. But these troops are often corrupt or unreliable, or responsible for the very humanitarian problems the NGOs are there to rectify. They can try to move with the rebels, but at the risk of being targeted by their rivals or the government. Most of the time, NGOs cannot choose both. They can move with UN or Western stability forces, which provide legitimacy and safety that host nation or rebels do not. However, in all cases NGOs will become linked to the political motives of their protectors and their freedom of movement is contingent on the approval of the security forces.
The consequence of this is that NGOs find themselves unable to operate in some war-torn regions because of a lack of security. Even if they do, the efficiency of their operations is lowered by their vulnerability to other actors. And especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, they will be viewed by the public and insurgents as tools of the US-led reconstruction forces.
Another possibility is to hire private security forces, an option that carries promises and perils of its own. NGOs providing their own security would not be seen as linked to any of the political factions battling it out in the operational environment. It would also give them a freedom of movement that they often lack during humanitarian disasters in war-torn regions. Market incentives could also provide efficient results that state-based security provides cannot. However, it also has a number of drawbacks.
For one, there is doubt over whether PMCs can adapt to humanitarian operations. PMCs in stability operations have mainly been used for force protection, private security, and training and organizing native forces. And in select cases, PMCs have even taken to the field (see Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone). But unless I'm mistaken there isn't much precedent for the large-scale use of hired guns providing security for NGOs in humanitarian operations without it being part of a larger Western military operation. At the same time, though, PMCs have already played small, but subtle roles in UN peacekeeping.
The organizational cultures, motivations, and priorities of PMCs and NGOs, are also strikingly different. This is not an attack on either, but there is little denying that there will be a culture clash between PMCs composed of former military men and security forces (frequently ex-paramilitaries) working to make a profit and (frequently left-leaning) NGOs looking to provide relief from the very kind of paramilitary forces that PMCs often draw from. However, it would be presumptious to say these differences are insurmountable.
There's also a variant of the humanitarian "mission creep" problem--an NGO might be so angered by atrocities that it may use its security forces to actively target non-state actors or government paramilitaries. However, the possibility of this depends very much on the character of the particular NGO.
Inevitable abuses in wartime by the PMC may taint the NGO, and despite the use of private security actors the political factions may view the NGO as a pawn of greater western powers. Establishing a regulated market, background checks, and a means of legal accountability for contractors who transgress in areas without the rule of law may also requre the intervention of a larger international institution. The legal issues involved in such a venture are extremely complex.
Lastly, there is very real danger that making NGOs armed actors will accelerate the state's loss of the monopoly of force. But given the growth of PMCs and the rise of non-state actors on the international scene, it may be a little bit late to worry about this.
I would also caution against using Blackwater and other PMCs' operations in Iraq as a means of comparison, given that their role was essentially force protection and private security. While that debate has relevance to the greater use of PMCs in countersinurgency and stability operations, the role being contemplated here is extremely different.
My mind isn't made up on whether NGOs should use PMCs--I'm not arguing for or against. As I've shown, there's very steep drawbacks. But this much is certain: at the end of the day NGOs will still have to find means of protecting themselves from armed actors who do not respect their neutrality.
I'd be curious to hear everyone's thoughts on this issue. Especially Mountainrunner, who is very well-versed in PMC issues, and Eddie of Hidden Unities, who writes frequently about humanitarian issues.
Conflict is one of the major causes of human misery. Whether it is economic desperation from wartime scarcity, the devastation inflicted by attacks on cities, the ravages of a brutal counterinsurgency, the generalized loss of safety of living in a collapsing state, or targeted political or ethnic purges, it is well-established that civilians suffer most from war. This is especially true today, when actors in interstate conflicts frequently target civilians as part of their war strategy. This does not solely include roving gangs like Ugandan Lords' Resistance Army and the Somalian "technicals." States regularly use political violence on their own people. Right now, Ethiopia is employing the oldest counterinsurgency tactic in the book against its Ogaden province: starve 'em all till they give up.
NGOs have traditionally relied on their neutrality and explicitly humanitarian mission for safety. Although many sides in civil wars frequently attacked NGOs, it is safe to say that in the broad picture their neutrality and reputation as peacemakers provided a more efficient form of protection from violence than guns and tanks.
However, this is not the case anymore. As Ralph Peters perceptively notes, the typical interstate foot soldier, government paramilitary or non-state fighter, is erratic, "habituated to violence, [and has] no stake in civil order. Unlike [conventional] soldiers, warriors do not play by our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like."
Rendering humanitarian aid becomes nearly impossible without dispersing these forces. A deal made with one commander will not be respected by the other. Food supplies will be diverted for war. And in many cases, the "warrior" is the cause of the humanitarian problem, targeting civilians for slave labor, torture, rape, and death. These fighters have little qualms about targeting humanitarian relief workers for either political or purely atavistic reasons. In a conflict where one side sees an entire ethnic group as the enemy, humanitarian aid to that group can make relief workers out to be "enemies" too.
Additionally, the identification of aid groups with the West and the United Nations can also endanger them in regions where anti-American or purely anti-Western feelings are strong. But many fighters need no kind of elaborate political justification to point their gun at a NGO. Any middle-class foreigner who operates in a conflict zone is a status target.
So, relief workers have a number of security options. However, who you choose to be protected by can immensely complicate humanitarian relief operations.
They can choose to be protected by host country forces. But these troops are often corrupt or unreliable, or responsible for the very humanitarian problems the NGOs are there to rectify. They can try to move with the rebels, but at the risk of being targeted by their rivals or the government. Most of the time, NGOs cannot choose both. They can move with UN or Western stability forces, which provide legitimacy and safety that host nation or rebels do not. However, in all cases NGOs will become linked to the political motives of their protectors and their freedom of movement is contingent on the approval of the security forces.
The consequence of this is that NGOs find themselves unable to operate in some war-torn regions because of a lack of security. Even if they do, the efficiency of their operations is lowered by their vulnerability to other actors. And especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, they will be viewed by the public and insurgents as tools of the US-led reconstruction forces.
Another possibility is to hire private security forces, an option that carries promises and perils of its own. NGOs providing their own security would not be seen as linked to any of the political factions battling it out in the operational environment. It would also give them a freedom of movement that they often lack during humanitarian disasters in war-torn regions. Market incentives could also provide efficient results that state-based security provides cannot. However, it also has a number of drawbacks.
For one, there is doubt over whether PMCs can adapt to humanitarian operations. PMCs in stability operations have mainly been used for force protection, private security, and training and organizing native forces. And in select cases, PMCs have even taken to the field (see Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone). But unless I'm mistaken there isn't much precedent for the large-scale use of hired guns providing security for NGOs in humanitarian operations without it being part of a larger Western military operation. At the same time, though, PMCs have already played small, but subtle roles in UN peacekeeping.
The organizational cultures, motivations, and priorities of PMCs and NGOs, are also strikingly different. This is not an attack on either, but there is little denying that there will be a culture clash between PMCs composed of former military men and security forces (frequently ex-paramilitaries) working to make a profit and (frequently left-leaning) NGOs looking to provide relief from the very kind of paramilitary forces that PMCs often draw from. However, it would be presumptious to say these differences are insurmountable.
There's also a variant of the humanitarian "mission creep" problem--an NGO might be so angered by atrocities that it may use its security forces to actively target non-state actors or government paramilitaries. However, the possibility of this depends very much on the character of the particular NGO.
Inevitable abuses in wartime by the PMC may taint the NGO, and despite the use of private security actors the political factions may view the NGO as a pawn of greater western powers. Establishing a regulated market, background checks, and a means of legal accountability for contractors who transgress in areas without the rule of law may also requre the intervention of a larger international institution. The legal issues involved in such a venture are extremely complex.
Lastly, there is very real danger that making NGOs armed actors will accelerate the state's loss of the monopoly of force. But given the growth of PMCs and the rise of non-state actors on the international scene, it may be a little bit late to worry about this.
I would also caution against using Blackwater and other PMCs' operations in Iraq as a means of comparison, given that their role was essentially force protection and private security. While that debate has relevance to the greater use of PMCs in countersinurgency and stability operations, the role being contemplated here is extremely different.
My mind isn't made up on whether NGOs should use PMCs--I'm not arguing for or against. As I've shown, there's very steep drawbacks. But this much is certain: at the end of the day NGOs will still have to find means of protecting themselves from armed actors who do not respect their neutrality.
I'd be curious to hear everyone's thoughts on this issue. Especially Mountainrunner, who is very well-versed in PMC issues, and Eddie of Hidden Unities, who writes frequently about humanitarian issues.
5 comments:
Whether its good or not, I don't know. PMCs would be out of the price range of many NGOs. However, they could enable the NGOs to protect themselves without compromising their independence from an occupying military.
Humanitarian aid too often becomes just another resource for armed groups to fight over. And refugee camps become nothing more than secure bases for those groups to recruit and regroup. NGOs can't separate themselves from the fighting in conflict zones, and they need to plan their operations accordingly.
Very good question, A.E. As a volunteer with the American Red Cross, this is a topic that could someday be of significant concern for me.
I think that Phil's comment (enabling the NGOs to protect themselves) is fraught with risk. A few years ago (pre-9/11) there was a fierce debate in the U.S. Coast Guard over the idea of arming their helicopters. Though it was ostensibly for "self-defensive" purposes, many thought that would degrade the USCG's reputation as an impartial life-saving organization.
The same would likely apply to NGOs. Rather than PMCs, it may be more apt for some internationally recognized body (e.g., the U.N.) to ensure personal security in volatile regions. I think the NGOs would benefit from having the powder blue helmets of U.N. forces versus the black polo shirts of Blackwater contractors providing their security.
"I think that Phil's comment (enabling the NGOs to protect themselves) is fraught with risk. A few years ago (pre-9/11) there was a fierce debate in the U.S. Coast Guard over the idea of arming their helicopters. Though it was ostensibly for "self-defensive" purposes, many thought that would degrade the USCG's reputation as an impartial life-saving organization."
That's interesting--I'd like to read more. Got any links?
Afraid not, Adam. These were personal contacts with a USCG ops officer at the HQ in Honolulu who was tracking it for their command.
I think given the increasingly fragmented nature of resistance in these theaters of NGO operation the incorporation of professional security with NGO efforts makes perfect sense so long as said security is strictly a protective element and not, as you explore, a possible armed element of the NGO's political prerogative. Though I'd assume that most PMC's would be a tad reluctant to engage in overt action via their employers want.
Post a Comment