After the New Deal and WWII, the Republicans were faced with a number of seemingly insurmountable problems.
- They were a traditional conservative party, in the European sense. They had stood against the rapid social change represented by the loosening of post WWI social mores, the New Deal, and American internationalism.
- A centralized liberal architecture had consolidated control over most important centers of power--i.e the labor unions, the great old old political machines , and the media.
- Republicans had no effective base of support to rival this. Religious voters and the much-maligned evangelicals had yet to become the political force they are today.
The 60's and 70's presented a number of opportunities to regain their lead.
- Liberal involvement in the civil rights movement and the loud emergence of the mainly middle to upper class New Left splinter movement separated Democrats from their working-class base. Southern whites (and some Northern ones, as represented by the Boston busing riots) were uncomfortable with the social change that they perceived was being forced on them. The New Left's anti-Americanism and the general shock of the counterculture alienated working-class Democrats.
- The United States experienced a crisis of modernity. The increasing encroachment of technology, media, and consumer capitalism began to erase the last vestiges of what was (perhaps falsely) idealized as classic "American Values." Crime, riots, government abuses and America's defeat in Vietnam contributed to a loss of public confidence in the future of the American Project.
- The power and diversity of media continued to grow by leaps and bounds. Instead of the centralized hierarchy seen in the late 19th to early 20th century, with a mass of media producers owned by a Hearst or a Pulitizer, we begin to see the beginning of today's freewheeling information landscape.
- Republicans, once playing the role of conservative isolationists, infiltrated and subverted the liberal foreign policy doctrine by transmuting it into neoconservatism, a extremely muscular form of liberal Wilsonian doctrine.
- Republicans, once derided as out of touch aristocrats, reached back into the era of Jacksonian populism to gain the loyalties of working-class and middle-class voters by appealing to their values. Thomas Frank correctly diagnosed this in his book What's The Matter With Kansas but made a crucial error in his thesis that Republicans fooled Democratic voters into voting against their own self-interests in favor of "moral values."
We do this every day when we evaluate whom we form relationships with, business, romantic, or otherwise. And in a media age, what politicians are essentially doing are attempting to do is create the illusion of a personal connection to the public. In an era of widespread cynicism where people believe they have no influence over the government, one cannot overstate the importance of a politician who tries to make people feel connected to the government.
George Lakoff described this process as "framing," and its true that we can see this, on a superficial level as matter of clever linguistics. In Lakoff's view, Republicans "framed" their opponents as out of touch, wealthy, and deviant intellectuals with a soft attitude towards crime and Communism and a hatred of working-class faith and community. However, what are the purposes of "frames?"
- To isolate the opponent from his bases of support.
- To divide the opponent's organization.
- To ultimately disrupt the opponent's thinking (OODA Loops) and destroy his resolve.
- Conservative journals, television shows, and talk radio
- Think-tanks, political action groups, and church organizations
- Emerging network of foreign policy professionals
However, it is increasingly apparent that the internet, which led to the creation of the "netroots," and the Bush-era decline of conservative legitimacy could lead to a similar moment for the Democrats. Stay tuned for later posts on this subject.

10 comments:
I've wanted to comment on this post, but have been swamped doing back-end maintenance on the blog...
I agree with a lot of what you've said here. One thing I often consider is this: that as any group or multiple groups gain proficiency in one style of warfare, the pressure to invent or develop the next style increases. I say, style, although you could put, generation, in that consideration. In any case, proficiency in utilizing a generational style of fighting also usually means greater proficiency at defending against that style, so opponents will need to "upgrade" if they have any hope of winning against a proficient 4GW foe.
Usually what happens is a bit else, however: When combatants are not fully aware of what it is they do, they may repeat the maneuvers or try new "tricks", thinking that the old is good but can be made better merely by adding a ".01" to the version number. Novelty masks the rut. Still, given enough revisions, a general generational upgrade may happen over a long time period. On the other hand, a genius might grasp suddenly what others have been unable to see and take the initiative, employing a style of fighting that really is a qualitatively different style than anything anyone else has been able to anticipate. (If he succeeds, others are sure to jump on that train, dragging their carcasses behind for some time or dumping them altogether.)
BTW, doesn't this post require a "Part 2" ?
AE,
"By doing so, conservatives isolated liberals from every center of power (and created a new one in the emerging religious bloc), disrupted their internal decision-making process, and changed the political environment. Now the Left would have to play by rules that inherently favored conservatives. The Clintonite "New Democrats" and their neoconservative-influenced foreign-policy troop all adopted Republican talking points and framing, much like Eisenhower's GOP had parroted Truman."
I think the victories are even stronger than that -- I don't think there's any questino that Eisenhower wanted to undo Roosevelt, or Clinton wanted to undo Reagan. Rather, like Britain after Thatcher, the question became one of management. The Revolution being achieved, people looked to the least revolutionary force (in order to better preserve the status quo post bellum).
Curtis,
"In any case, proficiency in utilizing a generational style of fighting also usually means greater proficiency at defending against that style, so opponents will need to "upgrade" if they have any hope of winning against a proficient 4GW foe."
Would you say that higher-G warfare is a product of a more complicated/advanced civilization and/or culture?
Dan,
I'm trying to see where, exactly, you got that question from that section of my comment!
Remember, I've contemplated an OODA-xGW overlay in a post titled "Observing the Maturing World." I'm not sure that maturity requires greater complexity, although it probably requires advancement! ;) However, if we think of a move away from largely linear warfare through asymmetric and "widely dispersed and largely undefined" warfare to a sort of expansive and yet inclusive warfare, it may seem like a movement up the chain of complexity from a linearly-restricted or even asymettrically-restricted p.o.v.
But I would consider the reverse:
"A more complicated/advanced civilization and/or culture" may also be the product of "higher-G warfare." I.e., the necessities produced by/in conflict have an effect on civilization and culture, as well.
Thanks for your comments on this post.
Curtis,
I think that the Democrats probably won't develop a 4GW capability for a long time because of what you said. However, they have to understand and trust decentralized networks to do so, and that means to embrace and develop the netroots. However, the netroots is substantially different from them, so this will lead to many awkward moments,
TDAXP,
To some extent, I think you're right, but it's hard to measure whether people loved Reagan-Bush I style of governing or loved the Reagan-Bush I personality and charisma, as is with Clinton.
Curtis,
I find this very intriguing:
"A more complicated/advanced civilization and/or culture" may also be the product of "higher-G warfare." I.e., the necessities produced by/in conflict have an effect on civilization and culture, as well."
Expand on it?
A.E.,
I think that expanding on it would require a whole entry, maybe a series! Essentially, two things:
1. Necessity, the "Mother of Invention," as a product of conflict, will produce changed civilizations/cultures that can survive that conflict. I suppose that's a perspective on evolutionary principles, or even a queer athropic principle since humanity has thus far been able to survive some major conflicts and we are therefore likely to look back on them superior to them.
2. Invention and innovation are almost always the result of the activities of individuals and/or small groups -- far below the level of "civilization" and "culture." Higher-G warfare, being the result of innovation in warfare, begins to occur before the civilization and/or culture catches up; thus, higher-G warfare has an effect on the civ/culture -- particularly as it begins to create new necessities and inspire new innovations (of the .01 variety, usually.)
These are just broad stabs at an expansion of the idea. I also think that innovators may be products of their civilization and culture -- i.e., the influence goes both ways. But the possibility of innovation requires a greater locus on the individual/small group and less on the civilization as a whole.
The problem with determining such an idea is that its essentially a chicken-and-egg thing. This is the major difference between William S. Lind and Thomas X. Hammes' conceptions of what enables 4GW---for Lind its technological and tactical and for Hammes it's more societal and social.
I've argued before that certain technological and sociological realities must occur before the next generation can appear. In fact, the thread I linked above, "Observing the Maturing World", was built around that idea; plus, I've somewhat argued the point when responding to Arherring's conceptualization of the role of technology, by asserting that advancing technology greatly affects our ability to observe and what we observe, thus affecting our ability to act and manner of acting.
The chicken/egg metaphor is particularly prescient, given the fact that no entity, Civilization, really exists; no, there are only individuals. I suppose that 5GW, as a cooperative effort, is something like the chicken, but that the planning and utilization of 5GW, the very idea of 5GW, is more individual-driven and is like the egg. Either one, however, is smaller than the Civilization as a whole: in fact, a higher-G warfare would not be effective or worth the while if everyone else was also already that G.
Actually, given some other conceptualizing from yours truly, I suppose I should say I'm ambivalent!
The question seems to be, does 5GW simply emerge on a broad scale, or is it an innovative approach purposely created by the warrior?
I lean more towards the societal interpretation. Because 5GW is such a difficult operational art, it will only be employable by a few, but that does not mean it will not arise from social factors (such as the information age)
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