I think it's important to emphasize that even if we see many more decentralized groups now, it's clear, as Martin Van Creveld argued, that this is partly a return to some very old methods of combat and organization. And in many non-Western parts of the world, there has been little change in how war has been waged since the beginning of what we would consider organized conflict. Conventional methods of fighting, just like the idea of the modern nation-state itself, is sometimes a purely Western imposition. But I have a bone to pick with this point:
"The fact that the Iraqi insurgency is a bewildering collection of small groups that frequently collaborate with one another is not a sign of a scary new age of "netwar." Instead, it is a tragically botched opportunity, a situation in which the government under siege and its great power patron should have been able to capitalize, during the first years of the occupation, on the small size and relative unpopularity of the insurgents."It's true that the conditions he outlines in Iraq--a destabilized state without legitimacy, multiple decentralized insurgent networks, intense tribal and ethnic divisions, and a thriving underground "terror market,"--are not new. But they are going to be present in nearly every future 21st century conflict. Traditional insurgencies like the Maoist campaign in Nepal are on the way out. Even though it places too much stock on its own novelty, netwar theory is valuable because it accepts the primacy of the transnational, non-hierarchal non-state actor, and develops a framework to both understand and counter his actions.
Of course, whether we're talking about Thomas P.M Barnett's "Core and Gap" theory, John Boyd, classic Galula/Nagl/Kitson counterinsurgency doctrine, John Robb's Global Guerrilla theory, 4GW or 5GW, or netwar, it's important keep our minds open to the advantages and disadvantages of all theoretical perspectives. This doesn't mean that they're all equally right or wrong, or that we can't advocate one doctrine or several overlapping doctrines. It just means that we can't become rigid in our thinking.

6 comments:
With every new counterinsurgency theory that pops into scholarly community I become more convinced we are over-abstracting things here. Could one of these authors answer one questions for me:
Where do you draw the line between "civil war" and counterinsurgency?
We spend so much time focused on how different armed groups operate that we completely ignore a thorough analysis of their objectives. I would bet 99% of groups in Iraq now (as opposed to 3 years ago when U.S. authority in Iraq was at least percieved as being greater) are focused on the ancient process of claiming territory through the application of force.
I don't think there's a difference between the two terms anymore. I can't recall a civil war within the last twenty to thirty years that was conventional in nature.
I agree though, that we are over-abstracting things. I just bought a RAND book from 2003 on defense policymaking where they used the terms "hyper" and "mud" warfare. Bizarre.
I suspect the reason we can't agree on a common terminology is that we're just in the beginning of a long process of change. Because we can only see small, contradictory, parts of the whole picture, we see different things and come to drastically different definitions for the same process.
To put it bluntly, I don't think we have enough people with backgrounds in sociology, political science and anthropology in the military community.
I work in a part of the Army that specializes in international relations and area studies, but I am greeted with blank stares when I mention Max Weber or Edward Said in conversation.
I tried to make my boss read La Distinction once, needless to say he quit after 50 pages.
That's a shame. Counterinsurgency theory would benefit from a critical examination of postcolonial theory--Edward Said, Frantz Fanon, Gayatri Spivak, and others.
There's a wealth of different perspectives that look at strategic and political situations from unique angles. Zizek's analysis of 9/11, in my opinion, is mind-blowing because he looks at it from the perspective of critical theory and film studies.
"Traditional insurgencies like the Maoist campaign in Nepal are on the way out."
Why? 4GW is two-thousand years old, at least. What has changed in the last decade to revoke history?
Thanks for the link. I had been waiting for a while to see someone explore that connection.
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